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Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again:  
Financialisation and the Management of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
Abstract 
 
The subprime mortgage debacle in the United States of America (USA) and the subsequent 
global credit crunch provoked a wide range of crisis management responses in different 
national settings. Such interventions are typically figured as the sovereign state coming to the 
rescue of the markets and the banks. In contrast, and offering a critical analysis of the 
character and content of the principal interventions of authorities in the heartland of the crisis 
in the USA and United Kingdom (UK) from Autumn 2007 through to 2009, we argue that 
these responses served to reproduce financialisation tendencies present across the seemingly 
separable domains of state and market which contributed to producing the crisis in the first 
place. Understood as a process co-constituted through pervasive but contradictory 
developments in capital accumulation, the risk management practices of lenders and the 
disciplining of borrowers, we show how, far from being seriously curtailed by crisis 
management, the financialisation of socio-economic life was actually buttressed during the 
very period in which its fragilities were most sharply exposed. In short, the management of 
the subprime crisis is a story akin to that of trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together 
again.             
 
Keywords: financialisation; subprime mortgages; capital accumulation; risk management; 
borrower discipline.     
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Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again:  
Financialisation and the Management of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
Introduction: “Big Government” 
 
Writing in the Autumn of 2009, and reflecting on the highly likely prospect of a victory for 
David Cameron’s Conservative Party in the United Kingdom (UK) General Election in the 
coming year, The Guardian newspaper’s Economics Editor Larry Elliott poses a conundrum. 
Why is it, he asks, that Cameron’s “main argument … that the economic mess we are in is the 
result of the failing of big government” is proving “amazingly successful at shifting the 
political battle onto his own ground” while, at the same time, the Labour government of 
Gordon Brown is unable to articulate an alternative at the very moment when “Making the 
case for interventionist social democracy has never been easier?”.1 For Elliott, the conundrum 
arises precisely because “Only by the most convoluted reasoning can the crisis of the past two 
years, and the events that led up to it, be described as a failure of big government”.2 The crisis 
to which Elliott refers is, of course, the global financial crisis that emerged out of the 
subprime mortgage market debacle in the United States of America (USA) from August 
2007. And, for him, the idea that the crisis was a consequence of “the failing of big 
government” is “the precise opposite of the truth” in two main senses: first, the crisis was the 
outcome of a state that “was too passive”, a state which relaxed the regulation of financial 
markets and cut taxes; and second, the crisis itself was a period of “Keynesian 
schedenfreude”, wherein “far from waiting for the invisible hand to work its magic, 
governments stepped in to prevent banks from failing, the financial system from imploding 
and the global economy from collapsing”.3  
 
4 
 
The focus of this article is upon the apparent interval that Elliott marks out, the period that 
witnessed a wide array of crisis management interventions by “big government” that took 
quite diverse forms in different national settings. Concentrating on the principal interventions 
by authorities in the heartland of the crisis in the USA and UK from Autumn 2007 through to 
2009, the article offers a quite different understanding of recent financial crisis management. 
This is because, for us, Elliott’s piece is an example of a wider problem in the prevailing 
interpretation and critical analysis of the management of the recent crisis: interventions in the 
crisis are viewed in terms of the sovereign state coming to the rescue of the markets and the 
banks. For those on the centre-left of politics, state interventions were thus interpreted, in the 
early stages of the crisis at least, as amounting to the decline of the pro-market neo-liberal 
state form and the emergence of a Keynesian-infused alternative. An editorial statement in the 
New Left Review by Susan Watkins, for example, suggests that ‘neo-Keynesian emergency 
packages’ have produced a partial shift in the balance between state and market that heralds a 
move to ‘regulatory liberalism’.4 For Elliott, meanwhile, such packages represent a missed 
opportunity for interventionist social democracy. After all, and as the post-Keynesian and 
Marxist traditions of political economy are at pains to stress, competitive banking and crisis-
prone financial markets necessarily require the last resort lending of sovereign institutions.
5
 
For those on the political right, meanwhile, the efficacy of crisis management is always in 
doubt and may well store-up dangers for the future. Consider, for example, Republican 
Senator James (Jim) Bunning now infamous description of the US Treasury’s $700 billion 
Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) of October 2008 as “financial socialism” and “un-
American”. Related, and for much of the Economics profession, financial crisis management 
provokes debates about “moral hazard”, that is, about the way in which state-led bailouts in 
the present may distort the operation of the self-regulating market mechanism in the future.
6
 
From a range of starting points and often for quite different and distinct reasons, then, 
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orthodox and critical political economy interpretations and analyses of recent crisis 
management tend to suggest that what matters is that this is a story of “big government”.  
 
Our opening contention here is that the prevailing “big government” explanation of the 
management of the crisis, which works through the binaries of states/markets and public/ 
private, tells us relatively little about what Matthew Watson calls the “character and content” 
of those interventions.
7
 There would seem very little doubt that state institutions, public 
guarantees and programmes have been crucial to forestalling the worst economic eventualities 
of the recent crisis, at least for the short-term. Nonetheless, the tendency to frame these 
interventions in terms of states/markets and public/private necessarily limits the 
understanding of important continuities which we see as at work in the US and UK in 
particular. Somewhat in contrast with varieties of continental European capitalism, for 
instance, the significance of financial markets in contemporary socio-economic life persists in 
the UK and USA. Inquiry into the “character and content” of crisis management suggests that 
it amounts to “breathing new life” into the financialisation of everyday life.8 Indeed, in taking 
this contention forward below, we will argue that management interventions in the crisis 
actually served to reproduce the financialisation processes that contributed to producing the 
crisis in the first place. What matters to understanding crisis management for us, and in the 
terms of the popular nursery rhyme, is that it is a story akin to trying to put Humpty Dumpty 
back together again. 
 
To this end, the article is divided into four main sections. We begin by briefly setting out 
what we understand by “financialisation”, a concept that, following Erturk et al., we develop 
by combining insights from political economy and cultural economy perspectives.
9
 For us, 
the financialisation of socio-economic life is a process co-constituted through pervasive but 
contradictory developments in capital accumulation, the risk management practices of 
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lenders, and the disciplining of borrowers. When exploring the principal crisis management 
interventions by authorities in the USA and UK from Autumn 2007, the remaining three 
sections critically analyse these interventions as they relate, in turn, to each of the three co-
constitutive forces of financialisation. What we will term financialised accumulation, 
financialised risk management and financialised discipline were all buttressed by crisis 
management interventions during the very period in which their fragilities were most sharply 
exposed. By way of conclusion, we return to Elliott’s conundrum in order to briefly consider 
the political implications of our analysis.  
 
The Forces of Financialisation 
 
As social scientific literature concerned with the processes of “financialisation” in socio-
economic life has grown over the last decade or so, attempts to classify it by academic 
discipline and theoretical approach (e.g. world-systems structuralist, French regulationist, 
historical materialist, institutionalist, poststructuralist, material sociologist) have become 
increasingly complex and arguably of only limited analytical value. Following Erturk et al, 
what is of greater importance is the way in which the analysis of financialisation can draw 
together valuable insights from both political economy and cultural economy perspectives. 
According to them, political economists “conceive of the economy as a machine of quantities 
and relations between categories like profit and liquidity whose logic is discovered and 
operates independently of analysis”.10 Cultural economists, meanwhile, primarily draw on 
poststructuralism and material sociology to engage with the social construction of “how the 
economy is formatted by discourses [and] performance”.11 Whilst we recognise that the 
problems and prospects of bringing these contrasting perspectives together are presently the 
subject of ontological and epistemological debates over what some term “cultural political 
economy,”12 what we propose here following Ertuk et al13 is more modest, deductive and 
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conceptual in character. Indeed, we note how recent and well-received research by others has 
set aside debates over a singular cultural political economy and, instead, has developed 
concepts from political economy and cultural economy to great critical analytical effect.
14
  
 
Specifically, then, we want to draw insights from both political economy and cultural 
economy perspectives in order to develop three categories for understanding the processes of 
financialisation; that is, what we will term the forces of financialised accumulation, 
financialised risk management, and financialised discipline. As the uncertain processes of 
financialisation are found to be at play in socio-economic life in the USA and UK in 
particular, we suggest that these forces, which can be identified from political economy and 
cultural economy perspectives, are co-constitutive. It is the coming together of these forces 
and their contradictions and tensions - change in how capital is accumulated, in how ‘default 
risk’ is managed by banks and other retail lenders, and in how borrowers are disciplined to 
meet their outstanding credit obligations – that is crucial to producing the broad tendency and 
orientation to financialisation.  
 
As political economists typically stress, there can be little doubt that capital accumulation in 
USA and UK has become marked, across the last three decades or so, by profits accrued from 
largely speculative tendencies that are, at once, somewhat decoupled from and dominant over 
a stagnant productive economy. While financialised accumulation would seem, at first blush, 
to be an oxymoron – after all, finance is always pivotal to capital accumulation – the point 
here is that finance comes to predominate socio-economic life during a particular time and 
place. The roots of this “finance-led growth regime”15 are to be found in four associated 
developments. First, capital has responded to the anaemic returns available from “real” 
productive investment - apparent since the over-production and under-consumption 
tendencies that emerged in the 1970s - by directing its attention to the global opportunities 
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presented by successive speculative bubbles centred on one class of financial market asset or 
another.
16
 For the US economy specifically, this shift in the predominant orientation of capital 
accumulation broadly mirrors that which has previously marked the pattern of hegemonic 
decline in the capitalist world-system.
17
 Second, the capacity of capital to gorge on 
speculative opportunities is politically and institutionally enabled, as policies that liberalise 
and deregulate markets and individualise welfare provision serve to open-up and legitimate 
financialised accumulation.
18
 Third, and somewhat paradoxically given its consequences for 
the productive economy and employment, much of the material resources of financialised 
accumulation are generated by shifting patterns in household saving, occupational pension 
provision and the revolution in so-called “financial services” since the 1980s.19 Growing 
numbers of the population hold a stake, however meagre, in the “mass investment culture”20 
or “coupon pool capitalism”21 of financialised accumulation, wherein their money is moved 
through the markets by massive institutional investors.
22
 Fourth, financialised accumulation is 
not limited to the domain of finance itself, but hollows-out productive enterprises and holds-
out “shareholder value” as the mantra by which their governance, performance and strategy 
comes to be judged.
23
     
 
The forces of financialised accumulation cannot be separated, however, from significant 
changes in how the uncertainties of outstanding debt obligations are calculated and managed 
as “risks”. What we would choose to call financialised risk enables and scientifically 
legitimates a vast array of profitable opportunities for lending and trading.
24
  In the form of 
organisational risk management, for example, probabilistic risk calculations are crucial as the 
dangerous possibilities that outstanding obligations will not be met (i.e. “default risks”) are 
seemingly diminished. Value-at-risk (VaR) - which emerged in the wake of the 1987 stock 
market crash and puts a number on the amount a bank could expect to lose on its portfolio of 
assets on a relatively bad day - has become integrated into bank’s organisational procedures 
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and subsequently into the 1997 Basel II (and now Basel III) global standards for capital 
adequacy.
25
 Default risks arising from all manner of loans are also routinely moved “off 
balance sheet”, put into circulation and traded by investors as a consequence of techniques of 
securitisation and structured finance.
26
 And, while rapidly growing “over-the-counter” 
markets for credit derivatives promise that the default risks of specific assets (e.g. a corporate 
bond) can be hedged through bespoke contracts, they also serve to fuel trading in volatility 
and variance which is marked by its indifference to the performance of specific underlying 
assets.
27
 
 
Processes of financialised accumulation and risk management are, moreover, also closely 
intertwined with changes in how debt relations are reproduced and governed in mass 
consumer markets. Across centuries, law has occupied a pivotal role in the criminalisation 
and punishment of debtors as “deviants”, ensuring their brutal imprisonment and “moral 
regulation” as constitutionally-defined citizens through to the mid-nineteenth century, for 
instance.
28
 In recent decades, however, what we might call the extra-legal and marketised 
mechanisms of financialised discipline have come to the fore. Alongside the juridical 
processes of bankruptcy and foreclosure/repossession, financialised discipline developed in 
response to the inherent problems of forging trust between lenders and borrowers in dispersed 
and decentred markets. Based upon their past credit histories, individual borrowers became 
subject to the apparently scientific and objective calculations of credit scoring by the principal 
agencies (Experian, Fair Isaac, TransUnion, and Equifax).
29
 For Burton, then, face-to-face 
relations of trust have been largely displaced in mass markets by the disciplinary control and 
forces of synchronisation and standardisation exercised through what she characterises as the 
“credit panopticon”.30 Deviancy and the failure to meet outstanding obligations by individual 
consumers (not constitutionally-defined citizens) is now punished by varying degrees of 
retribution through markets and by lenders; from graduated increases in the individual cost of 
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credit by virtue of the calculations and classifications of so-called “risk-based pricing”, 
through to denial and exclusion.
31
 
 
While the co-constitutive forces of financialisation are highly pervasive in Anglo-American 
socio-economic life, they nonetheless remain laden with tensions and contradictory 
tendencies which constantly threaten to undermine them. As the following sections will show 
in detail, these general tendencies have been spectacularly revealed in the recent crisis and its 
management. Financialised accumulation creates, deepens (via leverage) and extends layers 
of apparently liquid asset claims on the “real economy” of production and consumption, but it 
nonetheless remains the case that these “illusionary” claims cannot be consistently met.32 
Financialised risk management, meanwhile, turns on the assumption that it is indeed possible 
to calculate, control, manage and price future uncertainties as risks. Yet, the future remains 
stubbornly and necessarily uncertain, and innovations in risk calculations only contribute to a 
dangerous “complacency” which can have deleterious consequences when it is shattered.33 
And, finally, the extra-legal mechanisms that mark financialised discipline and work on and 
through borrower subjects also have an important Achilles heel. Borrowers are not isolated 
individuals who can be separated-out, broken-down, classified and priced as default risks, but 
are very much embedded in the rhythms and uncertainties of socio-economic life which may 
well undermine even their best laid plans to meet outstanding debt obligations.                           
 
Managing Financialised Accumulation  
         
In the run-up to the recent crisis, it was the subprime sector of the mortgage market in the 
USA that provided the focal point for the latest wave of global financialised accumulation. 
Mortgage lending to those deemed to fall within the category of “subprime” - borrowers with 
low, irregular or unverifiable incomes such as workers on temporary employment contracts or 
the self-employed, and/or those with poor credit histories and scores as a consequence of no 
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borrowing record, past failures to meet obligations or bankruptcy – boomed from the mid-
1990s through to the first years of the new millennium, and accelerated again from 2003 
through to 2006, with new originations in 2006 standing at somewhere between $605 billion 
and $625 billion.
34
 Such was the scale of these new originations that subprime lending came 
to account for between one-fifth and one-quarter of all new mortgage originations and re- 
mortgaging in the US in 2006. What was most significant in the financialised accumulation of 
subprime, however, were the ways in which assets related to and derived from these 
mortgages also became the focus for speculation on Wall Street and far beyond. As Ashton 
has it, global investors were motivated by an increasingly voracious “appetite for yield” 
which led to a feeding frenzy on the seemingly high risk-weighted returns available from 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) as particular 
classes of assets.
35
 Burgeoning markets for bespoke credit default swaps (CDS) offered the 
related opportunity to hedge and speculate on fluctuations in the value of these assets, 
including shorting their prospects.
36
 Investors, moreover, were increasingly highly-leveraged. 
The major investment banks, for example, typically took positions on subprime assets on their 
own accounts and also lent in support of the strategies of hedge funds and became involved in 
the so-called “liquidity leverage” of structured investment vehicles (SIVs).37 SIVs sought to 
take advantage of interest rate arbitrage, borrowing short-term with the backing of the banks 
that typically owned and ran them, and investing in MBS and especially CDOs. 
 
Confronted in the Autumn of 2007 by the unravelling of the subprime speculative wave, 
public authorities in the USA did take steps to clamp down on what had been a largely 
unregulated sector of mortgage market lending. Yet, what was more notable were the various 
ways in which authorities sought to support highly-leveraged banks that were imperilled by 
portfolios stuffed with subprime assets which were rapidly falling in value. For the first 
twelve-months or so of the crisis, and like other central banks globally, The Federal Reserve 
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and Bank of England focused much of their efforts on “pumping” or “injecting liquidity” into 
inter-bank and short-term money markets, making sharp interest rate cuts and lending to 
commercial banks via their discount windows in increasingly large amounts against 
increasingly poor quality assets as collateral. These markets had “frozen-up” amidst 
uncertainties over the solvency of holders of subprime assets which were compounded by the 
short-selling of banking stocks. The Fed also created the $200 billion Term Securities 
Lending Facility (TSLF) in March 2008, a program that provided support for investment 
banks for the first time since the 1930s by permitting them to anonymously swap their 
holdings of mortgage-related instruments for Treasury bonds for up to 28 days.
38
 Latterly, 
from March 2009 in the UK and November 2009 in the USA, the Bank and the Fed 
effectively printed money in order to buy the bonds issued by their own governments under 
the auspices of “quantitative easing”.   
 
Alongside such interventions undertaken largely in the name of restoring liquidity to markets, 
further crisis management initiatives in the USA and UK focused, first, on subprime assets 
which had become “toxic” and, latterly, on the solvency and capitalisation of banks and other 
institutions that, with the high-profile exception of Lehman Brothers which was allowed to 
collapse in September 2008, were deemed “too big to fail”. While quite different in the 
apparent solutions that they offered to the crisis, these sets of initiatives had one crucial 
feature in common: rather than ruling-out, enclosing and/or tightly restricting the global 
movements and machinations of financialised accumulation, they sought to keep open 
opportunities for on-going and future speculation.                       
 
As the crisis unfolded, investors struggled to value, price and trade the portfolios of subprime 
assets that they had accumulated during the preceding years. In the parlance of the period, 
these assets had now become “illiquid”, “distressed”, “troubled”, and “toxic”. For example, 
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when Merrill Lynch sold its portfolio CDOs worth $31 billion to private equity firm Lone 
Star in June and July 2008, it did so at a drastic discount price of 22 cents in the dollar.
39
 
Crisis management interventions that targeted toxic assets were both ad hoc and systematic. 
So, for example, when investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed in March 2008 and was taken 
over by JP Morgan Chase, the Federal Reserve conjured up Maiden Lane LLC as a “bad 
bank” in order to take $29 billion worth of Bear’s toxic assets onto its own balance sheet and 
to hold them to maturity. Not dissimilarly, in the UK, and as part of the UK Treasury’s £28 
billion Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 2008 which nationalised Northern Rock, £10 
billion was spent separating-out toxic assets into what became known as Northern Rock Asset 
Management (NRAM). When “bad banks” were not created in the course of incremental 
crisis management, public guarantees were extended. In November 2008, for instance, the 
UK government formally provided guarantees of £282 billion on toxic assets of Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS).
40
 The same month saw a similar $306 billion guarantee by the US 
Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on the assets of Citigroup.
41
  
 
Both sides of the Atlantic also witnessed more systematic interventions which attempted, in 
the terms of Michel Foucault, to sift the “good” and “bad” assets of speculative subprime 
circulations.
42
 In the UK, the Special Liquidity Scheme of April 2008 enabled the Bank of 
England to lend up to £185 billion worth of Treasury bills in exchange for banks’ toxic 
mortgage-related assets.
43
 Swaps took place at significantly discounted prices which favoured 
the banks and, as such, the Scheme amounted to “a direct credit gift from society as mandated 
by government policy”.44 It was the US Treasury’s TARP, however, that was the most high-
profile and infamous systematic attempt to sift subprime asset circulations. Aping the design 
of the Resolution Trust Corporation which managed the assets of failed institutions in the 
savings and loans (S&L) debacle of the 1980s and early 1990s, the TARP proposal to 
Congress in late-September 2008 requested authority “to issue up to $700 billion of Treasury 
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securities to finance the purchase of troubled assets”.45 Under the terms of what was also 
known as “the Paulson plan” – the TARP was the brainchild of then US Treasury Secretary 
Henry (Hank) Paulson - such subprime assets were to be purchased from investors by the 
Treasury’s newly created Office of Financial Stability through a reverse auction process and 
at prices higher than those presently prevailing in markets. It was also suggested, most clearly 
by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, that the purchase of toxic assets by the Treasury 
and their subsequent re-sale would enable so-called “price discovery”, encouraging investors 
to return to these asset markets and, ultimately, restoring flows of mortgage lending and 
global financial circulations more broadly.
46
  
 
Within two weeks of coming into effect on 3
rd
 October as the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, however, the TARP had mutated from its initial design. Taking 
advantage of an original legislative provision which gave the Treasury Secretary “discretion 
… to purchase other assets, as deemed necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets,” 
the first $250 billion of TARP monies were used to purchase preference shares and thereby to 
directly recapitalise the major US banks and financial institutions.
47
 The workings of the 
TARP had quickly come to focus, then, not on toxic subprime assets but on the direct 
recapitalisation of otherwise insolvent banks, an orientation that remained as Congress 
granted the release of the second half of the TARP monies in January 2009 and as the 
President Obama came into office.  
 
The precise origins of this shift in the principal orientation of the management of the 
problems of financialised accumulation in the USA are unclear, but they appear to lie on the 
other side of the Atlantic and in the apparent success of interventions by Gordon Brown’s 
Labour government in the UK in early October. Brown’s £500 billion emergency financial 
rescue package earmarked £250bn to guarantee bank’s short and medium term wholesale debt 
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obligations, but also purchased preference shares worth £37 billion in two struggling banks 
(RBS and Lloyds TSB). Further and similar purchases of preference shares in these banks 
worth £39 billion were made in the following month.
48
 The focus of Brown’s crisis 
management solution on direct bank recapitalisation was embraced by a meeting of the Group 
of 7 (G-7) finance ministries and central bankers in Washington on 10 October, and 
subsequently became the intervention of choice that buttressed financialised accumulation.
49
 
In the USA, where the Federal Reserve had already engineered the “conservatorship” of the 
government chartered but publicly-traded mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
early September 2008, this shift entailed a decisive reorientation of the objectives of the 
TARP in dealing with the bad circulations of subprime assets.     
 
Managing Financialised Risk Management  
 
The rise of the techniques of financialised risk management – that is, the combination of VaR 
models, securitisation techniques, structured finance and credit derivative markets - was 
crucial to inflating the bubble of subprime asset speculation. VaR underpinned significant 
savings by banks on the liabilities side of their balance sheets. With VaR in place, they 
appeared to require less capital to cover the risk of potential losses from their ever-
burgeoning assets, a model of organisational risk management that had been thoroughly 
legitimated by the 1997 revision to Basel capital adequacy standards.
50
 Meanwhile, the 
securitisation and structuring of subprime mortgages epitomised what seemed possible in an 
era in which “default risk” management was financialised. Specialist subprime lenders 
typically lacked the deposit base of banks, and so their capacity to grow their assets and 
manage default risks was reliant on the kind of extensive securitisation programmes that were 
celebrated by the so-called “originate and distribute model” of banking which held sway from 
the late 1990s. The MBS and CDOs that were issued, highly-ranked by Standard & Poor’s, 
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Moody’s and Fitch (the primary bond rating agencies) and which circulated on the back of the 
subprime lending boom apparently ensured that, even for this “risky business” which targeted 
borrowers who were much more likely to struggle to make their repayments, default risks 
were distributed between investors able to hold them and would not, therefore, pose a 
“systemic risk”.51 Moreover, CDS seemingly provided for the further distribution of default 
risks and the so-called “completion of the markets”, as investors in MBS and CDOs could 
hedge their positions through bespoke contracts provided by institutions such as insurer 
American International Group (AIG). 
 
Given the co-constitutive relations of the forces of financialised accumulation and risk 
management, it is revealing that, at its outset in particular, it was commonplace for the crisis 
to be rendered as a “mispricing” or “underpricing of risk”. With their prices in freefall, it 
appeared that the assessment and valuation of assets related to and derived from subprime 
mortgages had been optimistic at best. As the crisis ripped from US subprime asset markets 
into money, capital and derivatives markets globally, a second and no less revealing metaphor 
of risk came into common currency in the figuring of the tumult: “excessive risk”. 
Miscalculations and failures in the pricing of risk, combined with the massive salaries and 
bonuses earned by those trading in those risks, had, it seemed, fed a dangerous euphoria of 
highly-leveraged speculation. As with many previous instances of financial crisis which have 
similarly been represented in terms of “excess”, it appeared again to be the case that markets 
had recklessly gone beyond what was rational and reasonable.
52
 But, in this instance, it was 
an excess of “risk” specifically, alongside an apparent evaporation of “liquidity”,53 that 
appeared to threaten not only individual banks and institutions but the circulations of global 
financial markets as a whole. 
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Confronted by the crisis of financialised risk management, debates raged amongst policy-
makers, media commentators and financiers over how best to intervene to rectify the 
problems of these techniques.  For those who centred their attention on the specific role of the 
bond rating agencies, the problem was that otherwise rational calculations of risk had become 
clouded by a perverse structure of incentives wherein those charged with making the critical 
judgements on MBS and CDOs simultaneously earned their fees from the issuers of those 
instruments.
54
 Others concentrated their fire on how to better deal with so-called “liquidity 
risk”. The measurement and management of capital adequacy under VaR models had 
assumed a “static environment” of market liquidity where “positions can be quickly closed 
out”, “closing large positions does not itself move market prices” and “the cost of hedging 
remains stable”.55 While the pre-crisis Basel II standard included guidance on capital 
provisions for a whole host of risks, “liquidity risk” was notable by its absence and thus 
became a key concern in the development of the new Basel III standard.
56
 
 
Amongst those on both sides of the Atlantic who sought to address the problems of the 
edifice of risk management more broadly, there was also an important difference of views 
which informed quite different kinds of interventions. For advocates of probabilistic risk 
management such as former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, for example, the 
problem was that risk calculations about the uncertain financial future had been undermined 
by the quality of the data upon which they were based. In his terms, “the data inputted into 
the risk management models generally covered the last two decades, a period of euphoria. 
Had instead the models been fitted more appropriately to historic periods of stress, capital 
requirements would have been much higher and the financial world would be in far better 
shape today”.57 VaR models, for example, which worked through the normal bell-shaped 
distribution curve of probability, were a poor guide to the future when their calculations were 
based on a period of largely uninterrupted financialised accumulation in one class of asset or 
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another. Responding to the “mispricing” and “excess of risk”, then, appeared to require a 
renovation of probabilistic risk management that turned on the up-dating of data. Consider for 
instance the on-going debates over the calculations of “default correlation” that are written 
into the rating of CDOs.
58
  
 
It was those who were less sanguine about the capacities of probabilistic risk management 
techniques, however, that gradually came to prevail as the crisis and its management 
unfolded. Interventions were made that reached-out towards an alternative form of 
financialised risk management which addressed precisely that which was unlikely and 
improbable, or what the influential work of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s described as “black 
swans”.59 Crucial in this respect was the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) of 
the first months of the Obama administration in Spring 2009. Part of the U.S. Treasury’s 
Capital Assistance Program (CAP) which evolved within the TARP, the SCAP projected 
whether the 19 largest bank holding companies had adequate capital on their balance sheets 
going forward and if they required further public recapitalisation. Between them, the 19 banks 
had already received $216 billion as a consequence of the previous rounds of TARP 
recapitalisation.
60
 
 
Commonly known as the “bank stress test”, the SCAP is widely regarded as a turning-point 
and beginning-of-the-end of the crisis in its heartland in the United States.
61
 But, what was 
especially notable about the SCAP, and the way in which it contributed to reviving 
financialised risk management, were the two “stress scenarios” that were acted on.62 This pair 
of imaginaries of macroeconomic performance which had not and may never have happened 
were acted on in the present and “as if” they had consequences for bank’s revenues and assets 
and, therefore, for projections about the adequacy or otherwise of the capital on their balance 
sheets. These “plausible ‘what if’ scenarios” featured assumptions about real GDP growth, 
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unemployment and house prices for 2009 and 2010.
63
 While the baseline scenario posited 
house price falls of -14% and -4% in 2009 and 2010, for example, for the more adverse 
scenario these projections were -22% and -7%. In conjunction with banks and using their 
year-end 2008 financial statement as a starting point, supervisors produced loss, revenue and 
reserve estimates for each institution that, combined with information on existing reserves 
and capital, were used to project capital buffers that banks would need under the two 
scenarios.  
 
The results of the SCAP in May 2009 envisaged that, under its more adverse scenario, 10 of 
the 19 bank holding companies included in the Program needed to raise a cumulative total of 
a further $75 billion in order to meet the required capital thresholds at the end of the two year 
horizon.
64
 The firms were given thirty days to produce a plan which, over the next six 
months, would raise this capital from the markets and/or via the CAP which would fund the 
purchase of preference shares and public recapitalisation. Particularly revealing as to the 
contribution of the SCAP to reviving financialised risk management was that it was the banks 
themselves and the markets of which they were part that acted on the imagined scenarios of 
the SCAP apparatus and in the name of the preparedness of recapitalisation. The 10 banks 
which were projected to raise fresh capital did so without recourse to CAP funds. Indeed, 
almost a month-to-the day after the results of the banks stress tests were announced, some of 
the 19 firms that it had included began to pay back the TARP monies which, from the 
previous Autumn, had funded their recapitalisation.
65
 When The Economist magazine had 
published a special report on international banking in May 2008, financial risk managers had 
been cast as “professionally gloomy” and taking “a hard look at themselves”66. But, in a 
similar report published exactly a year later and in the same month as the results of the SCAP, 
there was apparently a “revolution within” financialised risk management in which the 
technique of stress testing was pivotal.
67
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Managing Financialised Discipline 
For subprime mortgage borrowers, the tensions and contradictions of the financialisation of 
socio-economic life have been experienced acutely as a “foreclosure crisis”. Foreclosure is 
the legal process through which lenders and loan servicers exercise a right to sell or to 
repossess ownership of the property which has been pledged as security for a mortgage. For 
some critical commentators, burgeoning foreclosure rates are the outcome of the largely 
unregulated “predatory lending” that preyed on African American and Hispanic families and 
neighbourhoods in particular and which prevailed in the subprime sector in the run up to the 
crisis.
68
 But, for us, this overlooks the extent to which the subprime lending model was reliant 
upon important changes in how debt relations are reproduced and governed in mass consumer 
markets. What we have termed financialised discipline – that is, the growing significance of 
extra-legal and marketised mechanisms of credit scoring and risk-based pricing, alongside the 
juridical punishment of non-payment by borrowers – was a constitutive force in the subprime 
boom. Without it, the targeting, sorting and pricing of “high risk” subprime borrowers in a 
legitimate and often celebrated sector of the mass mortgage market prior to the crisis would 
have been impossible. As Martha Poon has shown, for example, the writing of credit scoring 
into mortgage underwriting standards was crucial to the flowering of the subprime sector.
69
    
 
What is also clear, of course, is that these extra-legal mechanisms of financialised discipline 
were found seriously wanting once the crisis took hold. Risk-based pricing failed, in its own 
terms, to effectively price default risk for individual borrowers and, as such, contributed to 
the collapse of subprime lending institutions and created serious doubts about the streams of 
repayments underpinning toxic MBS and CDOs. For lenders and their securitisation 
programmes, the graduated rates of interest that were payable by subprime borrowers, over 
and above the rates paid in the “prime sector”, were supposed to be sufficient to cover the 
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losses arising from a comparatively high rate of default across a whole portfolio of loans. To 
be clear, then, it was not that subprime mortgagees were not calculated to be more likely to 
default on their home loans, but that these calculations of risk failed to capture and control an 
uncertain future. For some, the reasons for this failure mirrored a manifestation of the broader 
problems of inadequate data that plagued probabilistic financialised risk management. The 
historical data that was available for subprime mortgagors only encompassed the last decade 
or so; a period of relatively low and stable interest rates, on the one hand, and rising house 
prices, on the other. So, for example, when seeking to defend the failure of HSBC Finance 
Corporation to predict the scale of defaults by subprime mortgagors, Chief Executive of 
HSBC Michael Geoghagan noted that “You’ve got to have history for analytics … the fact of 
the matter is there [isn’t history] for the adjustable rate mortgage business when you’ve had 
17 jumps in US interest rates”.70  
 
For others, however, the failures of risk-based pricing arose from an Achilles heal which is 
widely recognised to be present in the credit scoring techniques from which risk-based 
pricing is derived: credit scores focus only on an individual’s past credit history.71 They do 
not take into account the possibility that a future change in economic conditions (e.g. 
recession, fall in property prices, rising interest rates) will effect not only prospects for an 
individual borrower, but also the large numbers of borrowers on a lender’s books. Risk-based 
pricing in subprime networks similarly only calculates default rates for individuals within a 
particular category. In the terms of those seeking to develop and perfect techniques of risk-
based pricing, then, these techniques do not address so-called “default correlation”. Writing 
prior to the crisis and based upon their analysis of the portfolio of a major subprime mortgage 
lender, Cowan and Cowan warn, for instance, that “as credit quality declines, the importance 
of default correlation increases … ignoring default correlation in the development of credit 
risk models for subprime portfolios would lead to considerable model risk”.72 In our terms, 
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the failure of risk-based pricing to take into account default correlation led to considerably 
more than just model risk. It ensured that, when widespread defaults occurred, subprime 
lenders incurred losses that were not only uncalculated but on a much greater scale than could 
have been predicted. 
 
The crisis management interventions in the USA and UK that buttressed financialised 
discipline were broadly two-fold. First, in terms of risk-based pricing specifically, a strategic 
policy drive focused on piercing the veil of its complexity and the ways in which this 
contributed to a “false sense of security” in the subprime and originate and distribute models 
of lending.
73
 Significantly, rather than yielding a clear-cut alternative to risk-based pricing, 
this drive is now beginning to herald an adaptation that tends to be referred to as the 
development of “affordability pricing”. Simply put, affordability pricing requires point of sale 
risk calculations not simply and only in relation to the variable of the immediate affordability 
of the obligations created, but also in relation to on-going and continuing affordability. For 
example, in the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) launched a consultation exercise 
in July 2010 which, in an effort to promote responsible mortgage lending practices, brought 
the issue of affordability to the fore.
74
 Reflecting the widespread criticism of the agency 
during the crisis and its new commitment to “take a much more interventionist and robust 
approach to regulating firms and markets”, the FSA state that “We believe that a robust and 
effective assessment of individual affordability has to underpin any sustainable lending 
model”.75 To this end, the consultation sets out proposals for “affordability assessments” at 
the point of sale that would produce important additions and revisions to pre-crisis practices. 
These include a regulatory requirement that lenders verify the incomes of would-be 
mortgagees based upon a source of evidence independent of the customer themselves, thereby 
effectively shutting down the market in self-certification mortgages. The proposals also 
feature measures to prevent the stretching of affordability through interest-only products or 
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extending mortgage terms, such that “affordability assessments must normally be based on a 
capital and interest basis, even for interest-only mortgages; and on a maximum term of 25 
years, even where the actual term is longer”.76 Moreover, and broadly mirroring the SCAP’s 
use of projected scenarios to supplement and up-date financialised organisational risk 
management, the FSA’s consultation proposes that future projected increases in interest rates, 
as determined by its own guidance, are to be used by lenders “to test mortgage payments” of 
applicants.
77
       
 
Second, crisis management interventions in relation to foreclosure specifically and the forces 
of financialised discipline more broadly have taken the form of support for forbearance. 
“Forbearance”, which literally means “calling a halt”, implies tolerance, moderation, leniency 
and even forgiveness by lenders or, as is typically the case in subprime and other securitised 
mortgages, by the loan servicers charged with collecting the repayments that underpin a pool 
of MBS. But, crisis management interventions cajoling forbearance largely reproduce rather 
than challenge the forces of financialised discipline, supporting what amounts to only a 
temporary and exceptional suspension of the norms of borrower responsibility for outstanding 
obligations.
78 
By its nature, and despite its many forms, forbearance is a set of arrangements 
negotiated on an individual basis by a lender or servicer company to reschedule and modify - 
and not expunge, cancel or take co-responsibility for - a debtor’s outstanding obligations.  
 
Furthermore, particular governmental interventions in support of forbearance have actually 
been constituted through the forces of financialised discipline in determining, for example, 
whether and on what terms a borrower may be eligible for a rescheduling of their obligations. 
Take, for example, the FHASecure programme in the USA. Introduced by then Treasury 
Secretary Hank Paulson as the crisis broke in August 2007, FHASecure transformed the 
underwriting standards of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to make it possible for 
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them to insure the new mortgages of delinquent borrowers for the first time, conditional on 
debtors negotiating forbearance with their lenders and refinancing from adjustable rate 
products to 30 year fixed-rate mortgages. But FSASecure employed a series of risk 
calculations to divide apparently deserving mortgagors who qualified for the scheme from the 
apparently undeserving who didn’t, and the insurance of new loans under FSASecure was 
also risk-rated such that borrowers paid differentiated and graduated premiums based upon a 
series of calculations about their likelihood of default.
79
  
By way of further illustration, consider the Obama administration’s “Make Home 
Affordable” programme that, after much fanfare, was introduced as a joint Treasury and 
Housing and Urban Development initiative in March 2009. Targeting around 8 million 
Americans who are said to be confronting the prospect of foreclosure with US$75 billion of 
support, the key elements of Making Home Affordable are HAMP and HARP.  HAMP, the 
Home Affordable Modification Program, is supposed to enable forbearance by lenders and 
servicers that reduces the level of monthly repayments; and HARP, the Home Affordable 
Refinance Program, is designed to enable forbearance in terms of remortgaging to lower rates 
of interest, especially for those who would otherwise be unable to refinance because falling 
house prices have undermined their equity at the same time as loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
have tightened. But, under the terms of HAMP, borrowers only become eligible if they can 
first negotiate forbearance that reduces their monthly repayments to 38% of their gross 
income. The Treasury and HUD then provide the lender or servicer with a flat $1,000 sum, 
and contribute match funding to further reduce down to 31% of the borrower’s gross income 
for a trial period and with a view to a permanent modification. However, discretion over 
forbearance is calculated as to whether it is in the best interests of the lender or the investors 
for whom, in effect, the loan servicer acts. Calculations as to what will be recovered through 
foreclosure (based on house prices, minus legal costs) are set against that which may (or may 
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not) be earned after forbearance. By August 2010, HAMP had achieved 422,000 permanent 
modifications. A further 600,000 households have been party to cancelled modifications 
under the scheme. 
 
Conclusions  
Offering a critical analysis of the principal managerial interventions by authorities in the 
heartland of the subprime crisis in the USA and UK from Autumn 2007 through to 2009, our 
argument here has been that these responses served to reproduce tendencies to the 
financialisation of socio-economic life which contributed to producing the crisis in the first 
place. Our account of this period of intense crisis management stands in contrast with the 
prevailing orthodox and critical views that turn on the binaries of state/market and 
public/private. For us, and to return to the terms of Larry Elliott with which we began this 
article, “big government” may well have been crucial to crisis management, but concentrating 
on this alone and its apparent implications for financial markets and state forms tells us very 
little about the make-up and purpose of the various “bad banks”, “liquidity schemes”, “bank 
bailouts” and so on. It does not articulate the ways in which the co-constitutive forces of 
financialised accumulation, risk management and discipline continued to be at work in the 
substance of pro-market crisis management. 
 
For Elliott, the question of how the crisis was managed is also a matter, however, of the 
missed opportunity that this represented for interventionist social democracy. Set against the 
backdrop of our analysis here, it becomes apparent that the opportunity offered by the 
moment of “Keynesian schedenfreude” was not missed simply because, as a consequence of 
its management, the financial crisis became a fiscal crisis. Now, it is undeniably the case that 
the costs of the crisis management, and the associated costs of the crisis in terms of rising 
unemployment and shrinking tax revenues, have been funded by heavy government 
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borrowing which, at the time of writing at the start of 2012, has become manifest in a so-
called “sovereign debt crisis” in the Eurozone. And, it is also clear that the austerity agenda of 
deficit reduction in the UK at least has “provided opportunity and cover for a sustained 
assault on the public sector, long considered by neoliberals as a drain and burden on the 
income-generating capacity of free market capitalism”.80 But, simply understanding these 
developments in terms of the binaries of state/market and public/private misses the point 
about the tendencies to the financialisation of socio-economic life that cut across these 
seemingly separable realms.  
 
It was the “Third way” social democratic parties of the mainstream political left on both sides 
of the Atlantic which, from the 1990s in particular, played up and played on the tendencies of 
financialisation.
81
 As Shaun French and Andrew Leyshon describe it, for example, the post-
1997 period in the UK witnessed an implicit Faustian pact brokered between the City and the 
Labour Government whereby the former was enabled to continue to generate enormous 
speculative profits on the basis that such business not only served to mask a large and 
widening trade imbalance, “but also helped to generate substantial tax receipts for the 
Treasury”.82 Labour thus funded public and quasi-public sector employment and regeneration 
and development strategies outside of the South-East “as a means to partly offset the social 
and regional disparities of financialisation”.83 As the Labour administration of Gordon Brown 
sought to manage the crisis, then, it effectively did so in the name of the continuation of a 
particular vision of social democracy which had flowered but then suddenly wilted amidst the 
forces of financialisation. While the authority and resources of big government were 
marshalled to try to put humpty dumpty back together again, articulating an alternative vision 
which displaces the financial markets from the heart of contemporary socio-economic life 
remains a much bigger challenge. As such, more recent high-profile and seemingly state-
empowering re-regulatory initiatives – including, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2009, the provision 
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of regulatory functions to be conducted by the Bank of England at the expense of the FSA, 
and the ‘ring-fencing’ of investment and commercial banking recommended by the Vickers 
Report 2011 – do not contain or elaborate upon an alternative vision. Certain pre-crisis 
opportunities for speculative financial accumulation may now have been closed-down, but the 
co-constitutive forces of financialised risk management and financialised discipline have been 
largely up-dated and revised rather than conclusively reformed.          
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